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Abstract
In protection systems, when traditional technology is replaced by software, the functionality
and complexity of the system is likely to increase. The quantitative evidence normally pro-
vided for safety certication of traditional systems cannot be relied upon in software-based
systems. Instead there is a need to provide qualitative evidence. As a basis for the required
qualitative evidence, we propose an object-based approach that allows modelling of both the
application and software domains. From the object class model of a system and a formal spec-
ication of the failure properties of its components, we generate a graph of failure propagation
over object classes, which is then used to generate a graph in terms of object instances in order
to conduct fault tree analysis. The model is validated by comparing the resulting minimal
cut sets with those obtained from the fault tree analysis of the original system. The approach
is illustrated on a case study based on a protection system from the Nuclear Industry.
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1 Introduction
Increasingly traditional technology (hydraulic, pneumatic, electronic) is being replaced by software
in process control systems. A typical consequence is that the functionality, and hence complexity,
of the software-based system tends to increase, making the system harder to certify as assurance
must be provided that the overall system risk is not increased. Evidence for certication is normally
provided by conducting safety analysis.
The quantitative evidence normally provided for traditional systems cannot be relied upon
in software-based systems, due to the diculty of obtaining estimates of failure rates. Instead
developers will need to place greater reliance on qualitative evidence. The object-based approach
we propose begins with a model of an original system implemented in conventional technology,
supported by the results of traditional safety analysis. The specication is used to derive an
abstract object model which is independent of the technology in which it may be implemented.
Safety analysis conducted on this model provides the required qualitative evidence that risk has
not increased. It also establishes criteria for assessing and certifying the software to be developed,
by providing a specication which reects the failure properties of the original system.
2 Method description
The method proposed in this paper consists of a set of techniques from the software and application
domains which are used to model the structure and behaviour of the existing system, and to
conduct safety analysis. The result of the method is a formalised fault tree which can be directly
compared with one produced for the original system.
The starting point for the method is a functional model of the original system, and its fault
tree with resultant minimal cut sets. The method then proceeds as follows:
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Object class model of system structure. The original system is analysed and, using the no-
tation of the object view of OMT [5], an object class model is produced which represents
the structure of the system.
Formal denition of class structure and behaviour. For each object class, its behaviour
and structure is formally specied using a modied form of interactor [2]. Instead of em-
ploying operational techniques (e.g. statecharts) to express the dynamic view of OMT, we
employ an axiomatic notation [1].
Causal analysis of object class model. From the object class model and interactor speci-
cations, a causal model is derived for the propagation of failure behaviours through object
classes. This step results in a graph of failure propagation over object classes which is termed
an impact structure (modied from the form in which it appears in [7]).
Fault tree instantiation. The graph of failure propagation over object classes can then be in-
stantiated for a particular top event and used as a basis to build a fault tree over object
instances.
Minimal cut sets comparison. Comparing the minimal cut sets from the fault tree derived
from the impact structure with the minimal cut sets derived from the original system, the
validity of the object class model can be assessed: if any new causes are included in the cut
sets then safety can be aected [10].
The techniques used in the method are established techniques employed in the elds of software
engineering (OMT and rst order predicate logic) and safety analysis (fault tree analysis and failure
mode and eect analysis), and novel techniques for safety analysis (impact structure).
The paper illustrates the method outlined above by introducing as a case study a protection
system for a Nuclear Power Plant. We begin by providing an overview of the system itself, and
then go through each step in the method to perform the modelling and analysis of the case study.
3 ESFAS case study description
The case study system is the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) employed as
part of the protection system in a Nuclear Power Plant [8].
The system monitors parameters in the plant and, in the event of abnormal plant conditions,
activates Engineered Safety Features, for example a safety injection signal. These safety features
maintain the safety of the reactor by providing core cooling, so reducing the damage to fuel and
fuel cladding, and preventing the release of radioactive materials.
The ESFAS initiates a safety injection signal if the value of one or more of the parameters
(pressurizer pressure, steam line pressure, containment pressure) exceeds a dened safety limit
during normal plant operation. The signal can also be actuated manually.
3.1 Structure of the ESFAS
The ESFAS consists of three or four redundant analog channels to measure each of the diverse
pressure parameters, and two digital trains employing solid-state logic to vote on the actuation of
a safety signal in the applicable conditions.
Redundancy is employed to ensure that no single failure can prevent actuation: only two out
of the four channels are needed to provide an actuation signal. This is known as 2/4 voting, or
2/3 when there are only three channels. 2/4 voting is used when the same parameter is also used
for control functions. Each digital train is capable of producing independently a safety injection
signal.
2
3.2 ESFAS Case study simplications
The resolution of modelling is selected so that only one parameter, measured on four channels, is
monitored. The system for our purposes consists of two redundant trains, four redundant channels
and two manual switches. The case study system is referred to as ESFAS SI Small , the small
version of the ESFAS Safety Injection system which is fully developed in [9]. The block diagram
presented in Figure 1 represents the functional model of the system.
CH1
CH2
CH3
CH4
Man_Act_B
Man_Act_A
Sum_A
Sum_B
Train_Logic_
A
Train_Logic_
B
Train_A
Train_B
ESFAS_SI_Small
Figure 1: ESFAS SI Small Block Diagram
4 Case study application
Having provided an overview of the system we now illustrate the proposed method in more detail.
We begin by forming an object class model of the structure of the system.
4.1 Object class model of system structure
We use the notation from the object view of OMT for our object class model, which shows the
objects in the system and their relationships. The object class model is formed by:
 identifying object classes - examining components of the system and abstracting common
entities;
 identifying associations - examining structural and inheritance relationships between object
classes, which leads to a hierarchical diagram of aggregation and specialisation of object
classes.
The resulting object class model for the case study is shown in Figure 2. This model decomposes
ESFAS SI Small into an aggregation (signied by a diamond) of Channel and Train classes.
The numbered black circles on the arcs signify multiplicity: there are four channels and two trains.
The Channel has an attribute, or state variable, which is the value of the setpoint for that channel
(a constant).
4.2 Formal denition of class structure and behaviour
From the object class model we now go on to formally specify the structure and behaviour of the
object classes of the system. An interactor [1, 2] provides a formal axiomatic representation of
the structure and behaviour of an object class. It is divided into declarations and predicates in a
similar way to a Z schema [4]. Table 1 is an interactor for the ESFAS SI Small class.
The declarations consist of a composed of eld (dening the structure) which says that the
object class consists of two instances of Train and an indexed sequence of Channels. The
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Figure 2: ESFAS SI Small Object Class Diagram
interactor ESFAS SI Small
composed of:
train A; train B Train
chann seqChannel
constants:
setpoint R Pressure setpoint
variables:
input variables:
reading seqR Pressure input readings
manual A;manual B B Manual actuation inputs
output variables:
esfas A; esfas B B ESFAS actuation signals
state variables:
high pressure B
invariant:
high pressure ,
(9 i ; j 2 f1:::4g  (i 6= j ) ^ (reading(i) > setpoint)
^ (reading(j ) > setpoint))
Pressure is high if and only if at least
two channel setpoints are exceeded
structure:
8 i 2 f1:::4g:chann(i):reading = reading(i) ^
train A:voters(i) = chann(i):channel signal ^
train B :voters(i) = chann(i):channel signal
esfas A = train A:vote
esfas B = train B :vote
manual A = train A:manual act
manual B = train B :manual act
behaviour:
normal:
((high pressure _ manual A), esfas A)
^ ((high pressure _ manual B), esfas B)
An actuation signal is produced if and
only if pressure is too high, or the rele-
vant manual actuation is present.
failure:
(: high pressure ^
((: manual A ^ esfas A) _
(: manual B ^ esfas B))
An actuation signal is produced despite
no automatic or manual signal { spuri-
ous actuation
_
(high pressure ^ (esfas A ^ : esfas B))
_ (: esfas A ^ esfas B)
Benign failure condition - only one ac-
tuation signal is produced
_
(high pressure ^ (: esfas A ^ : esfas B)) _
(manual A ^ : esfas A) _
(manual B ^ : esfas B)
Failure to produce actuation signal
when needed { critical failure
Table 1: Interactor for object class ESFAS SI Small
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indexed sequence is an abstraction of an array. Constants and variables are dealt with next: each
declaration gives name, type and an optional comment for variable listed.
The predicates consist of an invariant, a structure eld dening how sub-classes communicate
(via input and output variables) and how these variables relate to the inputs and outputs of the
object class being specied in the interactor, and a behaviour eld which denes the possible
behaviour modes of the object class.
In terms of the variables dened in the interactor, the requirements that the system must
satisfy can be summarised as follows:
1. Whenever the high pressure threshold is exceeded on at least two channels, at least one of
the trains must generate a safety injection signal:
high pressure ) (esfas A _ esfas B)
2. The safety injection signal on each train can be independently actuated by a manual switch:
(manual A) esfas A) ^ (manual B ) esfas B)
3. The injection signal should not be activated spuriously:
(esfas A) high pressure _ manual A)
^ (esfas B ) high pressure _ manual B)
Disjunction of the above requirements characterises the normal behaviour of ESFAS SI Small ,
specied in the interactor (Table 1) as
((high pressure _ manual A), esfas A)
^ ((high pressure _ manual B), esfas B)
A consequence of the normal behaviour is that high pressure ) (esfas A ^ esfas B). The normal
behaviour satises all the requirements.
Failure behaviours are identied either by negating the normal behaviour of the object class
or by applying the FMEA technique to identify possible failure behaviours of the object class [6].
By negating the normal behaviour predicate for ESFAS SI Small , we obtain
(: high pressure ^ (: manual A ^ esfas A) _ (: manual B ^ esfas B)
_ (high pressure ^ (: esfas A _ : esfas B))
_ (manual A ^ : esfas A) _ (manual B ^ : esfas B)
The rst line in this predicate is related with spurious generation of an actuation signal. The
remaining lines are related with a combination of critical and benign failures (benign being the
case when one train fails but the requirements are still satised). This can be rewritten to separate
out the failure modes. The benign failure is specied as
(high pressure ^ ((esfas a ^ : esfas b) _ (: esfas a ^ esfas b)))
and critical failure is specied as
(high pressure ^ (: esfas a ^ : esfas b))
_ (manual a ^ : esfas a) _ (manual b ^ : esfas b)
Each of these failure conditions is represented by a failure mode (spurious, benign or critical)
in the behaviour of the interactor.
The method denes an interactor for each object class in the model (Train, Train Logic,
Sum, Manual Actuation, Channel). The Channel is an example of a primitive object class,
which is specied by the interactor in Table 2. The failure behaviour is obtained from the negation
of the normal behaviour in the same way as above: in this case there is no benign failure.
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interactor Channel
constants:
setpoint R A channel has a constant setpoint
variables:
input variables:
reading R pressure value
output variables:
channel signal B channel output
behaviour:
normal:
(reading  setpoint), channel signal A signal is produced by the channel
whenever the input reading exceeds the
setpoint.
failure:
((reading  setpoint) ^ : channel signal) Critical failure of the channel: no signal
produced despite input reading exceeding
setpoint
_
((reading < setpoint) ^ channel signal) Spurious signal produced by channel
when setpoint is not exceeded
Table 2: Interactor for object class Channel
4.3 Causal analysis of object class model
In this section, we describe a systematic method for the derivation of a graph of failure propa-
gation over the modelled object classes which provides the basis for the analysis of causes and
consequences of failures. The graph is known as the impact structure [7] and is derived from the
information provided within the object class model, and the interactor specications.
The components of an impact structure are nodes which represent object classes and arrows
(connecting classes) which represent an impacts relation between classes. An impacts relation
exists between two classes, when the behaviour of one aects the other.
There are two types of impacts relations, impacts between sub-classes of a common aggregate
class (intra-impacts) and impacts between a sub-class and its aggregate class (inter-impacts).
intra-impacts For classes A:B and A:C an intra-impact relation exists if A:B impacts A:C , and
is depicted by a solid arrow connecting A:B to A:C .
inter-impacts For class A and sub-class A:B an inter-impact relation exists if A:B impacts A,
and is depicted by a broken arrow connecting A:B to A.
There are three ways of composing impacts:
n-impacts For two object classes A and B , B impacts A with multiplicity n if, according to the
interactor specication, at least n instances of B must fail in order to impact an instance
of A. An n-impacts is represented by annotating the arrow with a circle containing the
particular number n.
and-impacts For object classes A;B and C , instances of both B and C must fail in order to
impact an instance of A. An and-impacts is represented by linking the arrows involved in
the relation with a 
 symbol.
or-impacts For object classes A;B and C , instances of either B or C must fail in order to impact
an instance of A. An or-impacts is represented by linking the arrows involved in the relation
with a  symbol.
The method for generating an impact structure is a three stage process, dened as follows.
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Figure 3: Impact structure for case study. (a) impact structure for the ESFAS SI Small class,
(b) impact structure forTrain subclass, (c) complete impact structure for the ESFAS SI Small .
Stage 1: Determine Impacts
The impacts of an aggregate class are derived by an examination of the composed of v and
structure elds on an interactor.
1. Intra-impacts. A solid arrow is drawn between any two object classes A;B if the
behaviour of one object class can aect the other, as specied in the structure eld of
the interactor for the aggregate object class.
2. Inter-impacts. A broken arrow is drawn between any two object classes A:B and A if
A has an output dened in terms of an output of A;B
Stage 2: Simplication of Impacts
The impacts structure obtained from Stage 1, can be simplied by the deletion of arrows and
nodes. Firstly, redundant arrows are deleted by examining the transitive closure (impacts+);
basically if the removal of an impacts relation will not change impacts+, the corresponding
arrow is deleted. Secondly, nodes are deleted by substituting the impact structure of an
aggregate class for the aggregate. After the substitution, those components with an impacts
relation to the aggregate class will inherit the impacts of that aggregate.
Stage 3: Composition of Impacts
The composition of the impacts obtained from Stage 2, can be identied in two steps.
1. Multiple composition. When there are multiple instances of a class that impact another
class, the interactor specications are examined to determine the multiplicity
2. Logical composition. When more than one class participates in an impact relation with
another class, the interactor specications are examined to determine if the behaviour
corresponds to an or-impacts or an and-impacts.
Figure 3 shows the evolution of the impact structure for the ESFAS SI Small case study.
Figure 3.a illustrates the impact structure for the class ESFAS SI Small , and depicts an inter-
impacts relation between the subclass Train and its aggregate class ESFAS SI Small , an intra-
impacts relation between the subclasses Channel and Train , and a 3-impacts composition be-
tween Channel and Train . Figure 3.b illustrates an and-impacts between subclasses Manual
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Actuation and Train Logic and subclass Sum , Figure 3.c illustrates a simplied structure
derived by merging gures 3.a and 3.b, deleting the subclass Train .
The impact structure provides a compact representation of failure propagation through object
classes, thus facilitating the process for conducting a cause{consequence failure analysis of the
object class model. Thereby providing an essential step to the systematic derivation of a fault tree
from an object class model. This is achieved by instantiating the impact structure of the object
class model, in order to obtain a structure representing failure propagation over object instances,
from which a fault tree can be then generated.
4.4 Fault tree instantiation
This section presents how to derive a fault tree, for a particular failure event, from an impact
structure of an object class model and the specication of interactors of the classes.
A fault tree consists of nodes, which represent failure events, and gates (\and", \or", and
numerical) which represent the causal relationships between the nodes [11].
The method for generating the fault tree from the impact structure and the specications of
the interactors proceeds in two stages:
Stage 1: Generating the nodes
 Some of the nodes of the fault tree are formed by instantiating the impact structure,
thus producing a node for each object instance of the classes in the impact structure.
 The nodes related to aggregate classes are split into two nodes. A node representing
the failure behaviour of the object instance, which is a primitive node, and another
node representing those failure behaviours which are to be rened at lower levels.
 For the particular failure event being analysed, each resulting node is annotated with
the respective axiomatic specication of the behaviour from the relevant interactor, and
when necessary modied to incorporate failure behaviours which are to be rened.
Stage 2: Generating the gates
 The gates of the fault tree are formed by referring to the composition of the impact
(and, or, n) and introducing the relevant gate. An \or" gate is also used to connect
two nodes that were produced by splitting the node representing an aggregate class.
Figure 4 shows the fault tree resulting from the application of this method to theESFAS SI Small
case study. The top node is annotated with the critical failure of the object classESFAS SI Small ,
the failure event for this tree. The fault tree contains primitive nodes SUM A and SUM B represent-
ing the failure behaviours of the class Sum . Similiarly primitive nodes are provided for the
failure behaviours of Manual Actuation , Train Logic, and Channel . The other intermediate
nodes (generated from splitting an aggregate class) of the fault tree represent failure propagation
from the primitive failure events to the top failure event. An example of an intermediate node
is NO SIGN A, which represent the propogation of failures from lower levels when SUM A exhibits
normal behaviour.
There is an \and" gate joining the failure events assocaited with the two Sum instances, since
the impact structure had an 2-impacts. The Channels are connected by a numerical gate \ 3",
since there are four instances and the impact structure had an 3-impacts.
The fault tree produced directly from the original system model is shown in Figure 5. Both
fault trees have been \pruned" for reasons of space.
In order to validate that the failure properties of the object class model are consistent with the
original system model, the minimial cut sets of their respective fault trees are compared [10, 3]. A
minimal cut set of a fault tree is a sets of failure, such that if any event of the set occurs the top fail-
ure event occurs. For example, one of the minimal cut sets resulting from the fault tree generated
from the impact structure: MAN ACT A, MAN ACT B, TRAIN LOGIC A, TRAIN LOGIC B.
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(exists i,j.i<>j ^ chann(i).channel_signal
  ^ chann(j).channel_signal)
¬ sum_A.signal ^       
(¬ train_logic_A.vote   ^   manual_A.manual_signal)
  v  (train_logic_A.vote  ^ ¬  manual_A.manual_signal)   
(¬ sum_A.signal ^    
  ¬ train_logic_A.vote ^ 
  ¬ manual_A.manual_signal)
((chann(1).reading >= setpoint) 
 ^  ¬ chann(1).channel_signal)
ESFAS_SI_Small fails to activate
No Train_Logic_A signal
No Sum A signal
(high_pressure ^ (¬ esfas_A ^ ¬ esfas_B))
 v (manual_A ^  ¬ esfas_A)
 v (manual_B ^  ¬ esfas_B)
Sum A failure
(¬ sum_A.signal ^
   (train_logic_A.vote
   v manual_A.manual_signal))
¬ train_logic_A.vote
Manual Actuation A switch fails
manual_A.manual_switch ^  
  ¬ manual_A.manual_signal
Train_Logic A failure
(exists  i,j.i<>j ^ chann(i).channel_signal
 ^  chann(j).channel_signal)    
 ^   ¬ train_logic_A.vote
Train_Logic A normal
>=3
Channel 1 fails Channel 2 fails
Channel 3 fails Channel 4 fails
(same form as NO_SUM_A_SIGN)Sum A normal
ESFAS_SI_SMALL
NO_SUM_A_SIGN
SUM_A NO_SIGN_A
NO_AUTO_SIGN_AMAN_ACT_A
TRAIN_LOGIC_A AN_CH_FAILURES
CH1
((chann(2).reading >= setpoint) 
 ^ ¬ chann(2).channel_signal)
CH2
((chann(3).reading >= setpoint) 
  ^ ¬ chann(3).channel_signal)
CH3
((chann(4).reading >= setpoint) 
  ^ ¬ chann(4).channel_signal)
CH4
^ ¬ train_logic_A.vote
¬ sum_B.signal ^  
(¬ train_logic_B.vote ^  ¬ manual_B.manual_signal)
 v (train_logic_B.vote ^  manual_B.manual_signal)   
No Sum B signal
NO_SUM_B_SIGN
Figure 4: Fault tree generated from impact structure
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NO AUTOMATIC, NO
MANUAL SIGNAL TO SUM_A
(same form as SMALL_SI_A)
FAILURE TO ACTUATE
SI SIGNAL
ESFAS_SI_SMALL
FAILURE TO ACTUATE
TRAIN A SI SIGNAL
FAILURE TO ACTUATE
TRAIN B SI SIGNAL
SMALL_SI_A SMALL_SI_B
SUM A FAILURE TO
ACTUATE
SUM_A NO_SIGN_A
NO MANUAL SIGNAL
TRAIN A
NO_MAN_SIGN_A NO_AUTO_SIGN_A
MAN_ACT_A
NO AUTOMATIC SIGNAL
TRAIN A
MANUAL SWITCH FAILS
TRAIN A
NO AUTO TRAIN A SI
SIGNAL WHEN RECEIV
SI FROM 2+ ANALOG
TRAIN_LOGIC_A
3+ ANALOG CHANNEL
FAILURE
AN_CH_FAILURES
ANALOG CHANNEL 1
FAILS TO ACTUATE
WHEN PRESS EX S.P.
CH1
ANALOG CHANNEL 2
FAILS TO ACTUATE
WHEN PRESS EX S.P.
ANALOG CHANNEL 3
FAILS TO ACTUATE
WHEN PRESS EX S.P.
ANALOG CHANNEL 4
FAILS TO ACTUATE
WHEN PRESS EX S.P.
CH2 CH3 CH4
>=3
Figure 5: Fault tree generated from original model
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If the minimal cut sets are equivalent, we can conclude that the new model is valid with respect
to the original system model. If not, the minimal cut sets will either be overlapping or (in the
worst case) disjoint. If there is an overlap the reasons must be investigated { a new failure may
have been created, or a failure from the original model may have been removed, in the case of
disjoint cut sets imply totally incompatible models. For this case study, the minimal cut sets
resulting from both fault trees are identical, which serves to validate the model.
5 Conclusions
The proposed method tackles the problems encountered by application domain engineers, when
investigating the feasibility of replacing a traditional system with a software based system. The
method provides qualitative evidence that a software based system can be developed which exhibits
the same failure properties as the traditional system. Thereby, providing assurance that the
software will not increase the risk posed by the system.
The method has been applied to a larger case study [9], which demonstrates the scalability of
the work. Further work includes formalising causality and investigation of applicability of other
safety analysis techniques.
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